Do Market Anomalies Add Up? by Steinfeldt, Larissa C
East Tennessee State University
Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University
Undergraduate Honors Theses Student Works
5-2014
Do Market Anomalies Add Up?
Larissa C. Steinfeldt
Follow this and additional works at: https://dc.etsu.edu/honors
Part of the Corporate Finance Commons, and the Finance and Financial Management Commons
This Honors Thesis - Withheld is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Works at Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State University.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Undergraduate Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ East Tennessee State
University. For more information, please contact digilib@etsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steinfeldt, Larissa C., "Do Market Anomalies Add Up?" (2014). Undergraduate Honors Theses. Paper 192. https://dc.etsu.edu/honors/
192
  
 
Do Market Anomalies Add Up? 
 
 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of Honors Diploma 
 
 
By 
 
 
Larissa Christina Steinfeldt 
The Honors College 
Honors-in-Discipline Program 
East Tennessee State University 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
       _________________________________ 
       Dr. William J. Trainor Jr., Faculty Mentor 
 
 
 _________________________________              
       Dr. Edward A. Baryla, Second Reader 
 
 
 _________________________________ 
       Scott Jeffress, Third Reader 
 
Larissa Steinfeldt 
 Do Market Anomalies Add Up?  
 
 
1 
 
Contents 
 
Introduction 2 
Literature Review 4 
Data and Methodology 9 
Results 15 
Applications 28 
Appendix 30  
Bibliography 46 
  
Larissa Steinfeldt 
 Do Market Anomalies Add Up?  
 
 
2 
 
Introduction 
 
In an efficient market, stock prices and returns adjust quickly to economic events as new information 
becomes available to investors. Thus, stock prices and returns should be relatively unpredictable and random. In 
reality, global stock exchanges show returns that cannot be explained by the Efficient Market Hypothesis which 
was originally put forth up by Eugene Fama (1965).  According to Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French, a 
market anomaly is an abnormal characteristic within the stock market that cannot be explained by the Capital 
Asset Pricing Model or other risk adjusting models (Fama & French, Dissecting Anomalies). Donald B. Keim calls 
them exceptions to the rule, as they are return distortions (Keim, 2006). Although they do not follow the rules of 
common models, they do not, in any way, prove these theories wrong (Latif, Arshad, Fatima , & Farooq, 2011). 
After anomalies are discovered they are often exploited by investors which forces excess returns to converge 
back to normal. Nevertheless, some anomalies’ abnormal returns remain over many years.  
There is a vast literature on market anomalies. The most established abnormalities seem to be size, 
price-to-earnings (P/E) ratio, price-to-book (P/B) value, momentum, and volatility. Abnormal returns have been 
found for stocks that are defined as small cap, low P/E ratio, low P/B value, high momentum, and low volatility. 
Existing literature provides information about the discovery of anomalies, evidence for their existence, 
and attempts to explain their existence. Some researchers have gone further and attempt to guide investors in 
investment decisions based on their knowledge of idiosyncrasies. These studies only test one or two anomalies 
simultaneously and some of their evidence found them to work well together. This study combines several 
anomalies within one portfolio and aims to find out whether a portfolio with many abnormal characteristics is 
able to outperform any other portfolio.  
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As the stock market becomes more and more competitive and the number of investors steadily 
increases, knowing how to invest in the market is a very important skill. To be successful, an investor needs to 
be extremely current in his or her knowledge about company news and global development. This is very difficult 
in the era of technology and having a different approach to investing may be a huge advantage. This study seeks 
to find a strategy that helps investors to use market anomalies in their portfolios. Individual anomalies are 
tested separately to first prove their existence and to ensure that they still exist. Individual portfolios are 
moreover separated by bullish and bearish market periods. This will indicate whether there is a difference in the 
anomalies’ performance in market upswings and market downturns. Next, stable anomalies are combined into 
various portfolios to test and compare their returns to portfolios without abnormal characteristics. The 
outcomes of this study will provide investors with information about single anomalies and the possibility of 
combining portfolios of anomalies to be relatively confident they will earn higher returns than average 
portfolios.  
Results suggest that the P/E anomaly, the P/B anomaly, and the size anomaly are still present and useful 
to create excess returns. This study was unable to provide evidence for the existence of the momentum 
anomaly or the volatility anomaly. Moreover, there is not enough evidence to assume that combining anomalies 
in a portfolio is helpful.  
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Literature Review 
 
The first market anomalies were discovered in the 1940s. Subsequently, increasing numbers of them 
were found; some stronger and some that disappeared quickly after discovery. In 1977 Sanjoy Basu became the 
first person to study the price-to-earnings ratio. His study scans the relation of a stock’s P/E ratio to its expected 
return. It shows that the lower the P/E ratio, the higher the expected return. As there is no justifiable reason for 
that to be the case, it is to be categorized as a market anomaly. Basu takes data from 1957 to 1971 and provides 
evidence that the P/E ratio anomaly exists (Basu, 1977).  
Rolf W. Banz followed with a study of the size-effect in 1981 using historical data from over 40 years. He 
performed a data test of stock portfolios with similar risk measures. The size effect occurs when stocks of small 
companies outperform stocks of large companies. Banz proved that the smallest 20% of companies earn annual 
returns that are up to 5% greater than those of other companies (Zacks, 2011). His study shows that the 
anomaly exists, but fails to give reasonable explanations for its existence. He also discovers that the results 
fluctuate and is not stable over different time periods. In addition, Banz states that the price-to-earnings ratio is 
likely to be a proxy for the size-effect, since the size-effect is significant even after adjusting for the P/E ratio 
(Banz, 1981).   
In his 2011 article “7 Market Anomalies Investors Should Know”, Stephen D. Simpson includes seven 
different market anomalies. The three that are important for this study are market-to-book ratio, size effect, and 
momentum. A low market-to-book ratio indicates high future returns. Simpson did not find this anomaly to be 
very strong and was only able to demonstrate it in large portfolios. Momentum implies that investors should buy 
stocks that were performing well over the past six months and sell stocks that were performing poorly over the 
past 6 months to be successful. (Simpson, 2011). Len Zacks, CEO and co-founder of Zacks Investment Research, 
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states that momentum is the continuing success of those stocks that performed well recently over the 
subsequent 1-12 months. Additionally, those stocks that underperformed recently are most likely to be 
unsuccessful again. He suggests taking a long position in the top decile and a short position in the bottom decile 
(Zacks, 2011). This strategy is also studied by Laurens Swinkels. He asserts that there is a significant connection 
between the momentum effect and other anomalies, such as the size effect. Nevertheless, the study does not 
find a reasonable explanation for this correlation. Furthermore, Swinkels points out that transaction costs play a 
significant role in measuring the momentum excess return. Since strategies using momentum often involve 
relatively small stocks, the proportional costs substantially moderate the momentum effect (Swinkels, 2004).  
Volatility is another anomaly that is studied by Andrew Ang, Robert J. Hodrick, Yuhang Xing, and Ziaoyan 
Zhang. They examine the relationship between volatility and expected return and discover abnormal patterns 
and distorted returns. The volatility anomaly implies that stocks with low volatility generate higher returns than 
stocks with high volatility. In an efficient market you would assume that the higher the risk, the higher the 
expected return. Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang approach the topic inversely, taking high volatility stocks and 
finding that those realize abnormally low returns. These results are stable through different holding periods, 
different economic states, recessions, expansions, volatile, and stable periods. Additionally, momentum analysis, 
size analysis, and value (market-to-book ratio) are included in this study to support the researchers’ reasoning. 
(Ang, Hodrick, Xing, & Zhang, 2006).  The research article by Eugene F. Fama and Kenneth R. French reconsiders 
size, value, growth, profitability, net stock issues, accruals, and momentum. They seek to find out how the size 
of the stocks affects the force of the anomalies.  The size effect is strong for microcap stocks and marginal for 
both small and big stocks. Momentum has a relatively strong force for small and big stocks, but only half the 
force for microcap stocks. Book-to-market value appears to be similar through all different size stocks. While 
most previous studies looked at all of these factors separately, Fama and French aim to connect them to find 
explanations that are still missing (Fama & French, Multifactor Explanations of Asset Pricing Anomalies, 1996). 
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When market anomalies are discovered and known, experienced investors begin exploiting them. 
Because of this,the distorted return in most cases slowly returns to what would be expected by the efficient 
market theory. The efficient market theory expects returns to be unpredictable and to adjust to all the 
information available to investors at any given time. With exploitation, the anomalies fade and the market tends 
to become more efficient. John A. List’s journal article tests whether market experience affects the existence of 
market anomalies. He reveals that it does have a remarkable influence. His findings were robust to change and 
effective in different marketplaces (List). Basing his assumptions on List’s and other similar studies, Tisa Silver 
argues that no one is able to repetitively profit from investing in anomalies. His research seeks to predict 
whether exploiting anomalies is worth an attempt. His conclusion is that it is not worth it because anomalies are 
either not predictable enough, or they disappear. No one ever knows if the same scenario is going to happen 
again. Moreover, the studies that were done were not all adjusted for risk, and the higher returns therefore are 
not undoubtedly higher on a risk adjusted basis. Silver emphasizes the limitations to anomaly studies. Since the 
studies are all based on historical data, there is no certainty that the anomalies will continue to outperform in 
the future. Hence it is problematic to achieve a high level of confidence in giving strategic advice to investors 
(Silver, 2009). 
Recent studies indicate that the anomalies that are reviewed in this research still exist.  Volatility, size 
effect, P/E ratio, value, and momentum are still behaving inversely to familiar models and therefore can still be 
categorized as anomalies. According to an article in the Research Journal of Finance and Accounting (2011), 
market anomalies remain. The authors give evidence for different anomalies including price-to-earnings ratio, 
market-to-book value, and momentum. They say that buying winning stocks is more risky, but then again offers 
high excess return opportunities (Latif, Arshad, Fatima , & Farooq, 2011).  
Research from the last 25 years in the field of market anomalies attempts to find strategies for investors 
on how to use them successfully.  In 1993, Narasimhan Jegadeesh and Sheridan Titman explain that buying past 
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winners and selling past losers (momentum) is a performing strategy. Their attempts to explain the anomaly 
with investor behavior does not fully succeed (Jegadeesh & Titman, 1993).  
Carrol D. Aby and Donald E. Vaughn published a book called “Asset Allocation Techniques and Financial 
Market Timing”. It concentrates on investment techniques, trading strategies, and good timing in the stock 
market. Chapter 10 focuses on numerous stock market anomalies; such as the January effect, size-related 
anomalies, market momentum anomalies and other distinctive situations. Different portfolio strategies are 
tested to see if there is a pattern of anomalies outperforming other stocks. Buying strong momentum stocks and 
those with a high stock ranking do yield excess returns while low momentum stocks did poorly. Other strategies 
were found to merely work under short-term conditions (Aby & Vaughn, 1995).  
Amir Amel-Zadeh reexamines the size effect. He samples the German stock market to address issues 
connected to the size-effect.  A relationship between size of businesses and their return can be seen and is 
further related to the businesses’ past performance. Therefore, size is connected to strong momentum. The 
author aims to explain the variation in stock returns by suggesting various possible reasons. He finds that the 
information flow, both positive and negative, from small businesses to the investors takes longer. This explains 
stronger upward and downward momentum at certain points of time (Amel-Zadeh, 2008). Having all of this in 
mind, Lehrer, an experienced portfolio manager who is currently doing research in this field, states in an 
interview that investment behavior is constantly changing, and investors must know how to stay up to date with 
all available information (Lehrer, 2013). 
An additional study by Priscilla Luk, Xiaowei Kang, and Frank Luo describes a strategy in which advantage 
is taken of the low volatility anomaly, declaring that stocks with a low volatility outperform stocks with a high 
volatility. Additionally weights of the stocks within the portfolio are altered by using their intrinsic value rather 
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than their market capitalization. Between 2000 and 2011, the portfolio created using this strategy outperformed 
the market-weight portfolios (Luk, Kang, & Luo, 2012). 
Len Zacks, CEO of Zacks Investment Research, and author of “The Handbook of Equity Market 
Anomalies”, reveals that market anomalies do stand out. His book is based on information from over 600 studies 
on anomalies and states that portfolios based on anomalies show a 15% growth in returns both long-term and 
short-term. Thus, investors who want to profit from them would have to invest both long-term and short-term. 
Zacks put together different portfolios, called the Zacks Index, which include stocks that fit into different 
anomaly categories. His portfolios show a remarkable growth in return after 25 years. Nonetheless, there are no 
research studies done to prove his outcomes (Zacks, 2011). 
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Data and Methodology 
Research Objectives 
The main research objective of this study is to find out if a portfolio, which is formed with stocks that fit 
into different categories of anomalies simultaneously, outperforms a portfolio that does not have any of these 
characteristics. The anomalies studied are price-to book value, price-earnings ratio, momentum, size, and 
volatility.  The study will reveal whether individual anomalies are existent and whether they maintain their 
advantage over different periods of time. Further, it will show whether it is a reliable strategy to combine 
different anomalies in one portfolio, and whether long-term holding would be recommendable. A beta portfolio 
in included to see whether this measure is related to returns. 
Hypotheses 
Testing the individual portfolios: 
H0: The slope is equal to zero. 
 B1 = 0  
 
H1: The slope is not equal to zero. 
 B1 ≠ 0 
 Where B is the slope of the average returns on the individual portfolios that are based on one 
individual anomaly.  
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Testing the combined portfolios: 
H0: The mean return of the portfolio including the lowest fifth or quarter of values is lower  or 
equal to the mean return of the portfolio including the highest fifth or quarter of values. 
 µlow ≤ µhigh 
 
H1: The mean return of the portfolio including the lowest fifth or quarter of values is higher 
than the mean return of the portfolio including the highest fifth or quarter of values. 
 µlow > µhigh 
Where µlow is the average return on the designed portfolio including the lowest fifth or quarter 
of appropriate measures, and µhigh is the average return on a portfolio including the highest fifth or 
quarter of anomaly values. 
 
Research Design and Statistical Tests 
For this study the two main data sources used were Research Insight and Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP). Both sources are high quality databases used in various financial research projects.  Research 
Insight was screened for stocks in three anomaly categories. It provided information for approximately 6000 
stocks: their market value, their price-earnings ratio, and their price-to-book value.  The time periods for which 
the data was selected include every six months period starting with December 1991 and going until December 
2012. Thus, it provided 41 six months periods. The database Center for Research in Security Prices was used to 
filter monthly return data for stocks within the same time periods. Having the previous six months cumulative 
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return made it possible to calculate momentum and volatility. Beta was calculated by using the previous three 
years monthly data. Data from both databases were merged into one spreadsheet. The process of merging left 
the main data pool containing 849 stocks that fit into the predetermined categories. Stocks that were missing at 
least one data set were eliminated. Additionally, stocks that showed negative P/E ratios in any of the periods, 
were ignored for that period. 
For each one of the anomalies, values were ranked and deciles were created for every 6 months period. 
The spreadsheets show the return of each anomaly based on the preceding month’s data for P/E, P/B, and size 
and based on the preceding 6-month’s data for momentum and volatility. That means that, for example, the 
Size-Portfolio return for the six months period July 1992 to December 1992 is shown in the first line (dec91) of 
Figure 1 in the appendix. The return for the smallest ten percent of stocks is shown in decile 0.1, the return for 
the ten to twenty percent range is shown in decile 0.2, and so forth. Average returns in excess of the risk free 
rate are calculated for all values at the bottom. All stocks in each portfolio are weighted equally. Organizing the 
returns into blocks of ten percent helps to determine whether there is a significant difference in return for small 
caps versus large caps, which will then help to confirm or deny the existence of market anomalies.  Price-
earnings ratio, size, volatility, and price-to-book value have to show a significantly higher average return in the 
lower deciles versus higher deciles to be proven existent. Momentum, on the other hand, has to show higher 
average returns in the upper deciles to show any evidence of the anomaly’s existence.  Moreover, this method 
shows whether the degree of the individual performances tends to remain stable, or whether it varies. The 
statistical tests that were conducted were chosen based on the screened data. The slope was calculated for 
every six months period for every individual anomaly.  This gives a first idea about the likely outcome of the 
tests. If the slope in negative, it means that the returns are greater in small deciles and decrease as they reach 
higher deciles. It is an inverse relationship. A positive slope indicates that the returns for the next period 
increase in correspondence with the decile increase. Next, a regression was run for every six months period for 
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every single anomaly in order to see whether the slope is significantly different from zero. R-Square is the 
coefficient of determination and helps to evaluate how well the regression line, the slope, fits to the given data 
points. It provides a percentage of how much of the variation in returns can be explained by the portfolio’s 
degree of anomaly.  It is calculated by using the least squares method and gives a measure of goodness of fit.  R-
Square can be any number between zero and one. The next two columns show values for F-Stat and P-Value 
respectively. Both are generated by conducting regression analysis (Ho: B1 = 0, H1: B1 ≠ 0). Generally, F-values 
of greater than 4 indicate significant evidence that the slope is significantly different from zero.  The regression 
was performed, assuming the null hypothesis is true, to compare two unrelated samples. The test assumes 
independent random samples and normally distributed populations. Moreover, it is a two-tailed test which 
means that the slopes can be different from zero in either direction. These tests are conducted for all anomalies 
individually for every 6 months period. Additionally, the averages over the whole twenty year period are tested. 
The column “No of success” in Figures 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 11 in the appendix shows a value of 1 for every six 
months period that gave evidence for the anomaly; i.e. return in decile 1 is greater than return in decile 10 
(reversed for momentum). Additionally, it displays the percentage change in return from lowest to highest 
decile.  At the bottom the percentages of successful periods within the whole 41 periods (20 years) and the last 
20 periods (10 years) are calculated. 
Furthermore, the data is filtered depending on the current market direction (benchmark S&P500). 
Figures 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 in the appendix display how the related data for the anomalies is matched to bullish 
and bear markets. This determines whether an anomaly is more observable within times of general upswing in 
the economy, or in times of recession. The same tests are run. 
In addition, four possible trading scenarios are evaluated. Having found that the anomalies actually 
exist, those anomalies are used as classifications to filter new stocks that fit into different categories of 
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abnormal observations simultaneously. These stocks are chosen because they show the most sensitive reaction 
to abnormal values and will be most likely to show distinct results in further tests. Up to three anomalies are 
combined in one portfolio. Portfolio A (Figure 13) includes two different portfolios. The first one combines 
stocks of the smallest 25% of companies and the lowest 25% of price-earnings ratio and price-to-book value. The 
second one combines stocks with the highest 25% of values for those three categories. Here, the time periods 
are exactly the same as for the individual anomalies. The number of stocks that is used in each portfolio can be 
seen in the first column of each possible scenario. The lower quarter’s stocks are the ones that follow the rules 
for the anomalies perfectly, the upper quarter’s stocks are the opposite, and, therefore, furthest away from 
being abnormal. Mean and standard deviation are displayed for every single period, and regressions that test for 
a difference in means, are run (T-statistic and P-value). In this case a one-tail test is used because we know that 
the anomalies actually exist. Their return is expected to be higher in a combined portfolio (H0: µlow ≤ µhigh, H1: 
µlow > µhigh). 
Portfolio B, Portfolio C, and Portfolio D (Figures 14 – 16) are all based on the lowest and highest 20% 
instead of 25% of abnormal values. The percentages were adjusted based on the amount of output.  It was 
made sure that the number of stocks that match the requirements of each portfolio does not fall under 30. This 
is a limitation to the study, since having these constraints made it difficult to find enough stocks for a diversified 
portfolio. Thus returns might be understated due to this limitation. The three portfolios based on 20% ranges 
are the combination of size and price-earnings ratio, the combination if size and price-to-book value, and the 
combination of price-to-book value and price-earnings ratio.  The same statistical values (t-statistic and p-value) 
are calculated for each of the five scenarios for each six months period.  If the absolute t-statistic is higher or 
equal to 2, it is significant. The higher the t-statistic, the more significant and reliable it is. The P-value depends 
on the confidence level. If the P-value is 0.05, we can be 95% confident with the result. If the P-value is .01, we 
can be 99% confident with the result. The column named “No of success” once again compares the mean of the 
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lower value portfolio with the mean of the higher value portfolio in every period. A value of 1 indicates that the 
first mean is actually lower than the second and the combined anomaly portfolio seems to work in this period. 
The percentage of successful periods is calculated below all periods.  The very bottom row of the spreadsheet 
displays the averages of each column. The statistical tests show whether there is a significant difference in the 
means of each lower percentile portfolio and each higher percentile portfolio. 
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Results 
Individual Portfolios 
 
Size-Portfolio 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value S&P500 
0.151 0.101 0.085 0.082 0.069 0.071 0.065 0.062 0.064 0.052 -0.008 0.716 20.135 0.002** 0.047477 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
The Figure above shows the average values of output for the size-portfolio. The slope is slightly negative. 
Hence, returns in the smaller ten percent ranges are somewhat higher than returns in the greater ten percent 
ranges. This indicates the likelihood of the existence of an abnormal price movement, since smaller companies’ 
stock seems to generate larger returns than big companies’ stock. R-Square explains how well the slope or 
regression line fits to the observed data. The average R-square of 0.716 says that 71.6% of the variation in 
returns is explained by the size of the firm. F-stat is 20.135 and therefore greater than 4. This indicates a 
significant relationship between the returns and the size variable. A p-value of 0.002 over all periods that were 
tested is a significant result. There is enough evidence to reject the Null with 99% confidence, and, thus, there is 
significant evidence for the size anomaly to exist. Over the whole tested timeframe of 20 years, 73.2% of all half-
year periods were successful. Over the last ten years (2002-2012) 75% of periods were successful.  The 
benchmark Standards&Poors500 showed an average return of 0.047477 or 4.7% over the studied time period. 
Comparing this to the average returns observed for the size-portfolio shows that this anomaly outperformed the 
benchmark in every decile. The S&P500 includes the 500 largest companies in the United States. Seeing that the 
small stocks used for this study outperform the large firms in the S&P500 further proves that size is an important 
factor.  
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Market Up: 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
0.194 0.130 0.112 0.116 0.098 0.109 0.104 0.104 0.105 0.096 -0.007 0.510 8.327 0.020* 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
In the periods when the market (S&P500) return is positive, the slope for this specific data is        -0.007, 
indicating an abnormality once again. R-square is 0.510 which is lower than the average for all periods, but still 
showing that the regression line explains the data spread pretty well. 51% of fluctuations in the returns can be 
explained by size. F-stat of 8.327 and a P-value of 0.020 are both significant and, therefore, there is significant 
evidence to reject the Null and say that the size anomaly exists when the market is up.  
 
Market Down: 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
0.031 0.020 0.008 -0.015 -0.037 -0.039 -0.047 -0.055 -0.053 -0.073 -0.011 0.967 235.516 0.000** 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
When the market is down, the results look somewhat different. The slope is still negative with -0.011. Its 
absolute value is higher when the market has negative returns, compared to when the market has positive 
returns. Thus, the size anomaly seems to work even better in times of recessions. R-square is 0.967; 
consequently, the slope explains the observed data very well and is a strong measure. 96.7% of return 
movement can be explained by the size of a company. The F-stat is very high with 235.516. This indicates an 
extremely significant relationship between returns and size variable. The P-value is 0.000 which indicates a 
99.9% confidence that there is enough evidence to reject the Null. The size anomaly does exist in times of 
recession.  
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P/E-Portfolio 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value S&P500 
0.134 0.115 0.084 0.076 0.064 0.063 0.066 0.051 0.059 0.047 -0.008 0.799 31.779 0.000** 0.047477 
 * Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
The table above shows the average output for the stocks based on P/E ratio. The slope is slightly 
negative with -0.008. Therefore, the returns tend to be higher, when the P/E ratio is low, and lower, when the 
P/E ratio is high. Thus, there is evidence for the existence of an anomaly here.  The slope does explain the data 
spread fairly well (R-square = 0.799). 79.9% of return variations can be explained by the P/E ratio. The F-stat is 
31.779 and, hence, significant. The P-value is 0.000 which rejects the Null with 99.9% confidence. 82.5% and 
90% of periods were found successful for the last 20 years (1992-2012) and the last ten year (2002-2012) 
respectively.  In comparison to the S&P500, the data returns outperform in the lower 90% of P/E ratios; the 
highest 10% show the same return as the benchmark. This is additional evidence for the existence of the 
anomaly.  
 
Market Up: 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
0.171 0.129 0.106 0.103 0.092 0.094 0.100 0.083 0.010 0.086 -0.007 0.593 11.640 0.009** 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
When the market has a positive return the slope is negative with -0.007. This number is close to the 
overall average discussed before. R-square is a little lower than the average for all periods (R-square = 0.593) 
indicating small fluctuations within the returns. 59.3% of these fluctuations can be explained by the P/E ratio. 
Looking at decile 0.6 and 0.7 we can see that the returns increased somewhat. The same occurs between 0.9 
and 1. The regression line, hence, explains the data spread sufficiently, but not as well as it explains the data 
spread for all periods. F-stat is somewhat lower than before, but nonetheless significant with a value of 11.64.   
The P-value is 0.009 and indicates that there is sufficient evidence to reject the Null here too.  
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Market Down: 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
0.018 0.065 0.015 -0.007 -0.022 -0.030 -0.035 -0.045 -0.062 -0.0667 -0.012 0.849 44.813 0.000** 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
In periods when the market is in a recession, the slope of the P/E- Portfolio returns is -0.012. It is 
considerably steeper than in periods of market upswing. This means that the anomaly is even more evident and 
gives more extreme returns whenever the market experiences a downward movement. This slope explains the 
data points well, since R-square is close to 1.0 with 0.849. 84.9% of the variations in returns can be explained by 
the P/E ratio. A value of 44.813 for F-stat specifies that there is a significant relationship between the two 
variables (returns and P/E). The P-value of 0.000 gives a 99.9% confidence level for rejecting the Null and, 
therefore, proving that the anomalies exist during recessions. 
 
 
P/B-Portfolio 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value S&P500 
0.156 0.098 0.087 0.076 0.072 0.070 0.069 0.069 0.065 0.068 -0.007 0.575 10.835 0.011* 0.047477 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
The table above shows the average return and output for the stocks in the P/B-Portfolio. A slope of -
0.007 indicates that there is evidence for the anomaly’s existence. Since the R-square is 0.575, the regression 
line does explain the data spread fairly well. 57.5% of the fluctuations in returns can be explained by the P/B 
ratio. The F-stat has a significant value of 10.835. The P-value in this case is 0.011. We can reject the Null with a 
99% confidence. There are 70.7% successful periods within the last twenty years and 65% of successful periods 
within the last ten years. All observed returns are outperforming the benchmark S&P500. 
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Market Up: 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
0.199 0.130 0.123 0.111 0.010 0.110 0.106 0.110 0.109 0.112 -0.006 0.410 5.554 0.046* 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
When the market is in an uptrend, the anomaly for price-to-book value appears to be weaker. The slope 
of the regression line is -0.006 which still indicates that lower price-to-book values lead to higher returns. The 
regression line does not explain the data spread as well as when it includes upswings and recessions (R-square = 
0.410). Only 41% of return movements can be explained by the P/B ratio. There is quite a bit of fluctuation 
observable in the returns of higher percentage ranges. The F-stat just reached a level of significance with 
5.554.The P-value is 0.046, meaning that there is enough evidence to reject the Null with 95% confidence.  
 
Market Down: 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
0.037 0.008 -0.014 -0.022 -0.007 -0.044 -0.037 -0.046 -0.060 -0.057 -0.010 0.866 51.738 0.000** 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
When the market is down, there is a larger decline of returns from small to large deciles (slope = -0.010). 
This slope explains the data points much better than the slope for the periods when the market is up (R-square = 
0.866). 86.6% of variations in returns can be explained by the P/B ratio. The F-stat is 51.738 and, thus, highly 
significant. A P-value of 0.000 indicates that there is sufficient evidence to reject the Null based on a 99.9% 
confidence level. 
The price-to-book value seems to work much better in times of recession than in times of market boom. 
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Momentum-Portfolio 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value S&P500 
0.123 0.082 0.077 0.065 0.075 0.072 0.073 0.073 0.077 0.095 -0.002 0.102 0.911 0.368 0.047477 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
The slightly negative slope of -0.002 indicates that the P-value is likely to be insignificant, since the 
Momentum-Portfolio has to have a positive slope with higher return in higher deciles. The R-square equals 0.102 
and, therefore, the regression line does not explain the data spread very well. Only 10.2% of the fluctuations in 
returns can be explained by momentum. The F-stat is insignificant at 0.911, while the P-value equals 0.368 and is 
not significant either. The percentage of successful periods is only 53.7% and 55% for the last twenty and ten 
years respectively.  There is not enough evidence to reject the Null. The returns in each decile are higher than 
the return on the market (S&P500). However, if the highest and lowest returns are ignored, there is only little 
difference between the returns. 
 
 
Market Up: 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
0.171 0.121 0.113 0.097 0.106 0.102 0.104 0.103 0.116 0.145 -0.002 0.058 0.493 0.503 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
In times of market boom, the statistical measures show similar results. The slope is slightly negative, 
indicating an insignificant P-value.  The R-square here is 0.058 and only 5.8% of the variation in returns can be 
explained by momentum. The F-stat is below 4 with a value of 0.493 and, therefore, not significant. R-square 
indicates low confidence in the slope, an extreme data spread, and not surprisingly, the P-value is insignificant at 
0.503. There is not enough evidence to reject the Null in times of market boom. 
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Market Down: 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
-0.012 -0.027 -0.027 -0.023 -0.014 -0.010 -0.014 -0.012 -0.035 -0.046 -0.002 0.149 1.398 0.271 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
In times of recession, the statistical values show similar results once again. The slope is the same with -
0.002; slightly negative. R-square is 0.149, meaning that merely 14.9% of the variation in returns can be 
explained by momentum. Therefore, the regression line does not explain the spread of the data points very well. 
The F-stat is 1.398, well below 4, and insignificant. The P-value is 0.271. There is not enough evidence to reject 
the Null in times of recession. 
 
 
 
Volatility-Portfolio 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value S&P500 
0.050 0.061 0.056 0.069 0.070 0.069 0.094 0.094 0.118 0.134 0.009 0.884 60.871 0.000** 0.047477 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
The slope of the Volatility-Portfolio’s returns is slightly positive at 0.009. This slope is representing the 
data spread pretty well (R-square = 0.884). 88.4% of the movement in returns can be explained by the degree of 
volatility. The F-stat though is significant with 60.871. The P-value is 0.000 and gives a confidence level of 99.9%, 
but the returns move exactly in the opposite direction than one would expect when assuming that it is an 
anomaly. Only 39% and 40% of periods are successful for twenty and ten years respectively. 
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Market Up: 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
0.068 0.086 0.084 0.097 0.104 0.106 0.136 0.143 0.166 0.192 0.013 0.932 109.345 0.000** 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
When the market is seeing positive returns, the test measures show the same results as above. The 
slope is slightly positive with 0.013 and 93.2% of the variation on returns can be explained by volatility (R-square 
= 0.932). F-stat is even higher with 109.345 and indicates a significant relationship between the returns and 
volatility. Although, the P-value is 0.000, the returns are moving into the wrong direction.  
 
 
Market Down:  
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
-0.000 -0.0103 -0.021 -0.011 -0.025 -0.036 -0.024 -0.043 -0.018 -0.031 -0.003 0.506 8.199 0.021* 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
When the market is in a downtrend, the slope is negative with -0.003. The R-square is weaker than for 
times of market boom, but 50.6% of the fluctuation in returns can still be explained by the level of volatility. F-
stat is weaker with 8.199, but still significant. The P-value is 0.021 which is substantial with a 95% confidence 
level. 
 
Beta-Portfolio 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value S&P500 
0.093 0.069 0.070 0.075 0.078 0.083 0.076 0.089 0.084 0.098 0.001 0.217 2.211 0.175 0.047477 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
The beta portfolio was tested in order to see whether it is related to returns. The slope for the beta 
stock returns is somewhat positive with 0.001. This indicates the likelihood of an insignificant P-value, since it 
shows low beta stocks will perform worse than high beta stocks. This would indicate an inverse relationship. 
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Looking at the individual returns for the various deciles though, it is obvious that the returns are not going a 
certain direction but rather are somewhat mixed up. Starting with returns of 0.93 in the lowest 10%, returns are 
decreasing and increasing, ending in a very high return for the highest 10%. This fluctuation is also displayed by 
the R-square value. The  R-square is close to zero with 0.217, meaning that the regression line does not explain 
the data spread very well. Only 21.7% of fluctuations in return can be explained by beta. The F-stat is 
insignificant at a value of 2.211. The P-value is 0.175 and insignificant as well. It implies that there is not enough 
evidence to reject the Null. Matching this, only 48.8% (20 years) and 40% (10 years) of periods are successful. 
The returns for all deciles are significantly higher than the S&P500 average return.  Thus, beta does not appear 
to be related to returns. 
 
 
Market Up: 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
0.1173 0.094 0.098 0.109 0.114 0.119 0.111 0.132 0.129 0.156 0.005 0.635 13.930 0.006** 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
 When the market has positive returns, the slope of the beta data is 0.005. The regression line does not 
explain the data spread perfectly (R-square = 0.635) but does do a decent job. 63.5% of the variations of returns 
can be explained by beta. The F-stat is above 4 in this case with a value of 13.930. The P-value is 0.006 and 
therefore significant with a 99% confidence level.  Beta does appear to be related to returns in times of market 
upswing. 
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Market Down: 
.1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 Slope R-square F-stat P-value 
0.026 -0.003 -0.009 -0.021 -0.023 -0.018 -0.022 -0.035 -0.045 -0.068 -0.008 0.857 48.067 0.000** 
* Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
When the market has negative returns, the slope of the regression line is negative with -0.008, and R-
square is 0.857.  This regression line does describe the data spread well, since beta can explain 85.7% of the 
variation in returns. The F-stat of 48.067 is highly significant. A P-value of 0.000 gives 99.9% confidence that beta 
is related to returns.  One could say that beta is a good measure of risk, if one knows the direction of the market. 
Generally, the above data analysis shows, that the most of the tested individual anomalies exist. The 
study was not able to prove all, with no evidence of momentum. Beta and volatility seem to be good risk 
measures, since high values perform well in positive markets and badly in negative markets. Hence, three of the 
six measures (Size, P/E, and P/B) are used in the combined portfolios A through E. Size, P/E, and P/B are robust 
to market changes and give excess returns at all times. Therefore, they are true anomalies. Size and P/E 
additionally show an increase in successful periods from the last twenty years to the recent ten years, indicating 
a rise in the force of the anomalies. 
 
 
 
Combined Portfolios 
After seeing that some individual anomalies outperformed, one would assume that combining these 
individual ones creates an even more successful portfolio. 
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* *Indicates significance level of 5%; ** indicates significance level of 1% 
Portfolio A: Size, Price-to-Earnings Ratio, and Price-to-Book Value 
Appendix Figure 13 compares the statistical results of a combined portfolio of size, P/E, and P/B stocks. 
The first mean and the first standard deviation are both based on the lowest 25% of values for each category. 
The second mean and standard deviation are based on the highest 25% of values (Portfolio A-low and Portfolio 
A-high). Portfolio A-low has an average return of 16.6%. This return outperforms size, P/E, and P/B returns in the 
first and second deciles. This means that the combined anomalies seem to perform better than the individual 
anomalies in the value ranges.  The average return of Portfolio A-high is 4.6% and, therefore, 12% lower than 
Portfolio A-low. This indicates that combining the anomalies works, since the returns in the lower deciles are 
higher than the returns in the higher deciles. All three individual anomalies in the ninth and tenth deciles have 
higher returns than Portfolio A-high. This shows that the combination of anomalies exaggerates the abnormality. 
The test statistics for the average over all forty-one periods reveal a significant T-stat and P-value with a 
99.9% confidence that there is enough evidence to reject the Null.  
 
 
 
          
  
Portfolio low 
 
Portfolio high 
   
  
Mean  Std. Dev. Mean  
Std. 
Dev   T-stat P-value 
Size, P/E, P/B 16.6 37.9 
 
4.6 21.8 
 
20 0.000** 
P/E, Size 17.1 41.5 
 
4.7 22.5 
 
22.4 0.000** 
P/E, P/B 14.1 33 
 
5.3 27.9 
 
28.2 0.000** 
P/B, Size 15.1 47.6   5.9 23.6   21.4 0.000** 
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Portfolio B: Size, Price-to-Earnings Ratio 
Portfolio B-low and Portfolio B-high combine only those stocks that fit into the lowest and highest 20% 
of size and price-to-earnings ratio (Figure 14). The percentage was adjusted from 25% to 20% because the 
volume of output data was large enough. Portfolio B-low has a mean return of 17.1% and Portfolio B-high has a 
mean return of 4.7%.  The individual portfolios for size and P/E fail to outperform the combined Portfolio B-low 
somewhat in the first and second decile. Both individual Portfolios’ ninth and tenth decile returns outperform 
the combined Portfolio B-high. This again indicates a more extreme abnormality when the anomalies are 
combined. 
The T-statistic for testing the average values is 22.4 and, therefore, significant. The P-value based on 
Portfolios B is 0.000 and therefore significant at the 99.9% confidence level. 
 
  
Portfolio C: Price-to-Earnings Ratio, Price-to-Book Value 
When combining price-to-earnings ratio and price-to-book value to form a portfolio, the test was based 
on the lowest and highest 20% for each value (Figure 15). The average means for Portfolio C-low and Portfolio C-
high are 14.1% and 5.3% respectively. The P/B-Portfolio outperforms this combined portfolio in the first decile. 
The return for the P/E-Portfolio is lower. In the higher deciles the P/E-Portfolio fails to outperform the combined 
portfolio. However, the T-statistic is positive with 28.2 and obviously significant. This is supported by a P-value of 
0.000, offering a confidence level of 99.9%.  
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Portfolio D: Size, Price-to-Book Value 
The combination of looking at the size of the firm and the price-to-book value of a firm is based on the 
lowest and highest 20% in each category (Figure 16). Percentages were adjusted due to the volume of output 
data. Portfolio D-low and Portfolio D-high are formed. The average return for Portfolio D-low is 15.1%. This 
mean, although it outperforms the benchmark, fails to outperform the individual portfolios’ returns. Both, Size 
Portfolio and P/B-Portfolio have greater first decile returns. The combined Portfolio D-high shows an average 
return of 5.9%, failing to outperform both single anomaly portfolios in their ninth and tenth deciles. Hence, 
combining the anomalies did not exaggerate the abnormal characteristic because the spread between low and 
high quintiles / quartiles is not greater than the individual portfolios spread between lowest and highest deciles. 
The T-statistic for the average means results in a significant value of 21.4 and the P-value supports this with a 
99.9% confidence level.  
Overall, all tested portfolios that combined anomalies were able to show at least 9% higher returns than 
their opposite portfolios. Nevertheless, only the two combinations of Size, P/E, P/B and Size, P/E succeeded in 
outperforming individual portfolios.  
These results are due to some limitations. Screening for stocks that fit into several categories limited the 
number of stocks dramatically. Having to adjust the percentages from deciles to quintiles or quartiles is making 
it more difficult to achieve high returns. 
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Applications 
 
The tests in this study first looked at the size anomaly, the price-earnings ratio anomaly, the price-to-
book value anomaly, momentum, and volatility anomaly. Statistical tests are performed to give evidence for or 
against the existence of these abnormal phenomena. Size Portfolio, P/E-Portfolio, and P/B Portfolio showed 
significant P-values; there is enough evidence to reject the Null and conclude that the anomalies still exist. 
Volatility was proven to be a good risk measure. Momentum Portfolio did not show clear results and we fail to 
reject the Null. Since those last two anomalies are very weak and this study failed to prove them, they are not 
included in the combined portfolios. 
Further, combined Portfolios A through D are formed. They include different combinations of the 
anomalies that were proved earlier. All the combined portfolios have significant P-values for their average 
returns. Nevertheless, combining anomalies does not seem to give the investor a spectacularly higher return 
than individual anomalies do. 
This study aims to find out whether market anomalies add up. These results show that market 
anomalies do add up, but fail to be significantly more successful than single anomalies.  One explanation for the 
difficulty in combining anomalies may be that this study had a percentage limitation. After having to adjust the 
portfolios due to volume, the compared portfolios included the lowest and highest 20% or even 25% of values. 
The difference in those is likely to not be as extreme as the difference in means of the individual portfolios that 
were based on deciles. Hence, through the increase in percentages it might be difficult to get a better return. 
This study was trying to find the best way investors should behave regarding stock market anomalies. 
Although all the tested combined portfolios (Portfolio A through D) seemed to give high returns, it is not easy to 
fully rely on combined anomalies. Relaxing the constraints in order to find enough stocks weakens the returns. 
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Basing portfolio strategy on this, therefore, might be critical for the average investor. More complicated model 
than the one used in this study might be successful. 
Investors who are still interested in investing in market anomaly stocks should rather look at the 
individual performance. Portfolios that are based on low P/E, low P/B, and small size tend to outperform. They 
were proven to work in both, bull and bear markets. The size anomaly is a good strategy to base investments on. 
Especially when the benchmark was having trouble with showing positive returns, small companies were still 
able to grow. All three anomalies can be used for long-term holding, since they all show a significant proof of 
existence over the whole 20 year period. Moreover, size anomaly and P/E anomaly even increased in force over 
the course of the study. 
The momentum anomaly is more difficult to implement in investment strategies. Momentum did not 
show significant results. This study was unable to prove the anomaly’s existence and, therefore, would not 
recommend basing investment on it.  Overall, although these stock market anomalies appear to exist, there is no 
guarantee they will continue to exist in the future. 
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Appendix 
Figure 1: Size-Portfolios 
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Figure2: Size-Portfolios in relation to benchmark returns 
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Figure 3: P/E-Portfolios 
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Figure 4: P/E-Portfolios in relation to benchmark returns 
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Figure 5: P/B-Portfolios 
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Figure 6: P/B-Portfolios in relation to benchmark returns 
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Figure 7: Momentum-Portfolios 
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Figure 8: Momentum-Portfolios in relation to benchmark returns 
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Figure 9: Volatility-Portfolios 
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Figure 10: Volatility-Portfolios in relation to benchmark returns 
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Figure 11: Beta-Portfolios 
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Figure 12: Beta-Portfolios in relation to benchmark returns 
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Figure 13: Combined Portfolio A: Size, P/E, P/B 
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Figure 14: Combined Portfolio B: Size, P/E 
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Figure 15: Combined Portfolio C: P/E, P/B 
 
 
 
  
Larissa Steinfeldt 
 Do Market Anomalies Add Up?  
 
 
45 
 
Figure 16: Combined Portfolio D: Size, P/B 
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